A first concern is the impact of increasing oil exports on the exporting country .
This was studied in Chichilnisky (1981a) within a two-region This result is reminiscent of the argument that British investment overseas in the nineteenth century benefited the country by developing overseas supplies of food and raw material, thus mating these supplies more elastic, keeping down prices, and improving the UK's terms of trade . Essentially we are specifying here conditions for overseas investment in material supplies to benefit the investing country even before any financial returns are paid. or in the case of a loan, before the loan is repaid.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows . To provide some empirical background, we begin by reviewing the case of Mexico . We then present the North-South model with debt. after which we prove the main theorems . The conclusions summarize the results, and an appendix shows that. although the model contains 33 independent equations, its comparative static properties can be understood by studying a single implicit functional relationship between one endogenous variable (the terms of trade of oil for industrial goods) and one exogenous parameter (the value of the debt) .
EIdPIRICAL BACKGROUND: THE CASE OF MEXICO
In this section we review briefly the empirical material relating to a number of the issues to be discussed below . The focus is on the case of Mexico, which is an important exemplar of the phenomena under examination . Cumuuvve E .iancso, " oavnw~n Oohnt, current f=un,
FIGURE i
The relationship between Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments deficit and investment in PEMEX, 1966 -1981 . (All figureq are in billions of 1970 In the Introduction we mentioned that the accumulation of Mexican debt is generally believed to have been associated with investment in PEMEX Figure 1 presents data on this association . Mexico's cumulative balance-of-payments deficit on current account is measured horizontally. The vertical axis represents cumulative investment in PEMEX All figures are in billions of 197® US dollars. and data sources are given after the tables below. It is clear from.; Figure 1 that there is an almost one-to-one association between the cumulative payments deficit and investments in PEMEX on average. the cumulative deficit slightly exceeds investment in PEMEX but the two move very closely indeed . This is confirmed by the regression in Table 1 . It therefore seems justifiable to claim that investment in PEMEX was financed by the payments deficit, and indeed this provides the empirical justification for an important assumption in the model that follows . What is the relationship between Mexico's cumulative current account paymentsdeficit, and her outstanding foreign debt? Figure 2 addresses this issue . Except for the period 1976-1979, these variables moved together . with the debt consistently some US32-3 billion in excess of the cumulative deficit. (Figures are again in billions of 1970 US dollars .) This interpretation of the graph is supported by the regression in Table 2 . and is consistent with the fact that there was substantial private overseas borrowing by Mexican citizens which was then used for the acquisition of overseas assets and which added to the accumulation of overseas debt . In the model which follows: this borrowing to acquire overseas assets is neglected : it is assumed that indebtedness is equal to the cumulative balance-of-payments deficit, and is used entirely to finance investment in the oil sector . Obviously, this is a good approximation to the data for Mexico . furthermore, it seems likely that borrowing to finance the private acquisition of overseas assets had little macroeconomic impact within Mexico . The important macroeconomic changes were driven by investment in the oil sector . and by the consequent changes in oil output and oil exports . In any case, we shall argue below that when the overseas investment by Mexicans is taken into account, the results are likely to be reinforced . Figure I reveals that Mexico's cumulative balance of payments deficit has risen over time. Figure 3 shows the movement in imports, exports and terms of trade which gave rise to this deficit . Exports rose steadily over the period, expecially after Mexico became a net oil exporter in 1976 . Due to the 1979 oil shortage, Mexico's terms of trade improved dramatically in 1980, reaching their peak in 1981 . In 1982 oil exports again expanded rapidly, increasing nearly fifty percent over 1981, but late in the year oil prices began to soften . By August of 1983 the average price of Mexican crude oil exports had fallen about 20% (Mayan crude fell from $28 .50 in 1981 to $23 .00, while the lighter 'Ishtmas' crude fell from $35.00 to $29.00 per barrel) . Having borrowed heavily to develop its petroleum resources, the terms of trade began to shift against Mexico just as it entered world markets as a major exporter. The downturn in oil prices contributed to a dramatic devaluation and the large contraction of imports shown in Figure 3 . The theoretical model of the next section explores the conditions Chichilnisky (1981a) . There are two regions, the North and the South. Each produces two goods, denoted B and 1, with three factors of production, capital K. labor L . and oil d . The South exports an input, oil, in exchange for a good. the "industrial" good 1 . The "basic" good B is not traded internationally.
We first specify the model for one region, namely the South. In what follows. the subscripts S and D will be used to denote supply and demand, and the superscripts N and S to denote variables or parameters referring to the North and South. respectively . All variables or parameters without a superscript refer to the South . The superscripts B and I after a factor (e.g. LB . KI) where r is the rate of profit . pl and pe will stand for the prices of industrial goods and of oil, respectively The demand for B derives from wage income PB BD = mL The South produces oil (within given bounds), without using either domestic capital or labor We shall assume that it uses the overseas borrowing or financial transfer FT to increase its oil supplies
This completes the behavioral specification for the South.
The equilibrium conditions for the South are :
where B is not traded internationally .
ID = IS + MS
where MS denotes the South's imports of I,
denote the amount of that factor used in sector B or 1, respectively . .
The basic good is produced according to the relation BS = min~LB / a v 68 / b, . KB / c lj (1) and the industrial good according to
Labor and capital supplies are responsive to their rewards .
where uj is the wage and pB the price of B . and
PBBD`PIID = WL + rK + POO + FT Note that FT could be either positive or negative, depending on the relative magnitudes of the debt service and the financial credit . However, as will be seen below, the effect of a transfer (FT positive) is not symmetric with that of a repayment (F7 negative), because of the irreversibility of the investment in the oil sector . We assume that the entire financial transfer FT is used to purchase industrial goods to augment the supply of oil. This means that the new industrial investment in the oil sector is paid for by foreign loans . Hence, oil supplies O s change as the debt level changes. the debt is assumed to increase with increases in the level of the transfer (,FT positive), but obviously, it does not decrease when FT is negative, since the debt is not paid by selling the oil production equipment . The balance-of-payments condition (15) is that imports of industrial goods exceed export revenues by FT . As the demand for the basic good B comes entirely from wage income (eqn. 5) . the national income identity ((16) below) implies that the demand for industrial goods comes from the profit income rK, oil revenues p dX1 . and the borrowing FT. with the last of these going to the oil sector . In the North we make a corresponding assumption . namely that the financial transfer to the South is taken from income that would otherwise have purchased industrial goods, so that the North's demand for industrial goods is rK-FT.
In an equilibrium situation, Walras' Law or the national income identity of the South is always satisfied (see e.g. Chichilnisky 1981x), i.e . and . of course, the equations corresponding to (8) and (9) (14) and the payments condition P"Xo = Pimp-FT (15) and traded quantities must also match:
where Xr and Xf represent. respectively, the North's exports of I and imports of oil. There are therefore two sets of eight exogenous parameters each, one set for the North and the other for the South. Each set contains a, Q, 9 1 . a2. b . 1 . b 2. c l , and C2. These parameters are generally different is the two regions. We shall make certain stylized assumptions to simplify computations : a is large in the South and relatively smaller in the North, indicating that labor is more "abundant" in the South. The corresponding parameter for capital exhibits the opposite behavior: P is larger in the North than in the South. We shall also assume that c 1 is small in the South i.e. the production of basic goods uses little capital . and a2 is small in the North. i.e. Northern industry uses little labor . There are a total of 33 independent equations for the complete North-South system : thirty correspond to two sets of (1) through (15). one set for each region, and three equations arise from the international trade conditions (1T) through (20) There are a number of determinants whose signs are important in the following sections, which determine factor intensities in the different sectors . In total we have the following technical input-output coefficients: a 1 b 1 c 1 a2 b2 c2 in each t'egion . The determinants to be used are :
The assumptions are :
The positivity of the determinant D implies that the basic goods sector is relatively more labor intensive and the industrial goods sector relatively more capital intensive . The assumption (made above) that the basic goods sector uses very little capital in the South implies that cs is small and therefore that XS < 0 . The industrial goods sector in the North was assumed to use little labor: hence a2 is small and Q1v < 0. The above assumptions on the signs of -Inthe various determinants are maintained at all points below unless there is an explicit statement to the contrary .
LAIN RESULTS : TRADE AND DEBT
This section studies the impact of a change in the net transfer FT on the economies of the North and the South. Before going on to the algebra, it seems useful to explain the economics of this impact.
An increase in the transfer FT increases oil supplies %3S. since the South invests borrowed funds in expanding the oil sector. At the new equilibrium . corresponding to higher FT, the total amount of oil utilized in the North and in the South therefore increases . This in turn alters the supplies of both goods in each region, possibly in different proportions . The composition of the product changes in both regions.
The changes in supplies lead to new equilibrium prices for the two goods . The prices of the factors labor and capital also change as relatively more or less labor and capital are employed. This implies that total income in the North and in the South are different at the new equilibrium . The results in this section give simple sufficient conditions for determining the signs of each of these effects .
The first theorem gives conditions under which an increase in oil supplies decreases the price of oil with respect to that of the industrial good. While it is intuitively plausible that the price of oil should drop as supplies increase, this is not always true . The second theorem gives conditions under which the relative price of oil increases as the transfer increases oil supplies . Whether one or the other result obtains, depends on the relative strength of supply and demand effects, and the general equilibrium solutions trace this in detail. The results are obtained from various assumptions on technologies and initial prices.
The next step is to explore the general equilibrium impacts of an increase in the relative price of industrial goods . The rate of profit rises both in the North and in the South . In the North. the rate of profit and the real wage move together, because the North's economy is rather homogeneous . Therefore, both wage and profit income increase in the North . and we show that there is also an increase in the consumption of both goods, even allowing for the loss of national income due to the transfer . All this occurs because the transfer has improved significantly the North's terms of trade .
In the South . because of the rather different technologies in the two sectors, the real wage moves in the opposite direction to the rate of profit. The transfer increases oil supplies and oil exports, but oil revenues in terms of industrial,,goods imported are reduced. Wage income and domestic consumption of basics decrease as well. If one sought to improve wage income without negatively affecting industrial consumption in the South, the economy of the South would have to be made more homogeneous .
The second theorem explores a different set of assumptions, and arrives at rather different conclusions . Now the transfer increases oil supplies, but it also increases the relative price of oil with respect to industrial goods As the terms of trade of the South improve, its macro variables react differently, and so do the variables in the North . The conditions under which one or the other result obtains are therefore quite relevant for policy, and should be determined empirically . The simulations in the next section are a first move in this direction.
A factor that plays an important role in determining the results of an increase in the transfer FT is the sign of the expression
where D is the determinant of the matrix
The role and interpretation of this term have been discussed elsewhere (Chichilnisky 1981a.b) . Basically, the sign of this expression determines whether income effects will dominate price effects, so that increases in supplies will be proportionately larger or smaller than increases in demand as prices change . We refer to an economy as dual if c2/ D < 2w / pg , since a large D would have this interpretation . Conversely, the economy is homogeneous if c 2/ D > 2w /pq . It should be noted that this condition can be written so as to be independent of the particular units of measurement used . (ii) The North exports. and the South imports. fewer industrial goods.
However. the terms of trade move in favor of the North (pt increases) so much that its export revenues rise . There is a corresponding fall in oil export revenues of the South denominated to terms of its import I .
(iii) Profits and real wages rise in the North, so much that its consumption of both goods increases.
(iv) /n the South. profits rise . but employment, real wages, and consumption of basics all fall .
Proof. We consider first the market-clearing condition in the oil market: XS
From (6). (9) . and (6)' . this equals :
From (14),
and from inverting ( :2) and (13) we obtain :
In view of (3) and (4) . we may rewrite ( 
It is then possible to differentiate implicitly across equilibria and obtain 8pl,8FT . or equivalently its reciprocal
This equat"lon represents the change in the price of industrial goods that follows an increase in the transfer FT . By (27) and (6) .
Therefore the sign of (29) is always that of -8r/, 8p1
We may now compute the derivative -8^/ 8pI . From, (27) and (28) (40) we may now determine the sign of ap B / aPl in both the North and the South. First note that ap B / apl is always positive in the North since p t > b 2, so that p1ci-M > 0, and G > 0 by assumption In the South A < 0, but fl is rather small . Therefore, (40) is also positive in the South. With this information we may now return to eqn (27) and compute pg % apl . As a is large in the South and P is large in the North, we have from eqn . 
Here M-c1PI = c1 6 2 -Lice -CIPI is negative as c I is small in the South. Hence the first term is positive (because MS < 0) and dominates the second, which is multiplied by c i . As Q'?~< 0, the third term is negative and the fourth positive But a2 is small in the North. so that the fourth term dominates .
Hence we have that
This implies that the price of industrial goods pl rises as the transfer to the South increases, i .e OPI aFT > 0
We next study the movements of the rate of return in the North r^l as pl Furthermore, from (32) and (33) Under the conditions of Theorem 2. this is negative, proving that the oil exporter's terms of trade improve . i.e. Pt falls with FT.
The rest of the theorem follows immediately . Inequality (43) implies that the profit rate in the North falls . and (44) implies that real wages in the North fall. Inequality (48) tells us that the North's exports (and the South's imports) of industrial goods will increase, and from (50) we then know that oil exports of the South fall (52) establishes that the rate of profit in the South falls, and using (44) again proves that real wages, employment, and consumption of basic goods rise in the South This completes the proof .
The main difference in the conditions of Theorems I and 2. which reverse the results, are first, the sign of Ms and second. the impact that the transfer has on the relative price of industrial goods. The sign of XS is positive in Theorem 2, and negative in Theorem 1 . It seems more plausible that YS should be negative, since this happens when the basic goods sector in the South uses few capital inputs . Theorem 2 assumes, instead, that the basic goods sector is more capital intensive. The impact of the transfer on prices seems also more plausible in Theorem 1 . There, the transfer increases oil supplies, and this leads to lower oil prices. In Theorem 2. the transfer also increases oil supplies, but this leads to higher oil prices. Clearly, an empirical analysis of the actual conditions is needed to evaluate the results, but. a priors, the conditions in Theorem 1 appear more intuitively natural than those in Theorem 2.
A final point is the stability of the equllibria under the standard Walrasian adjustment process in which prices increase with excess demand, and decrease with excess supply . This is a rather specialized issue since the model has con stant returns to scale . The Walrasian stability of a closely related model (Chichilnisky 1981b) has been studied in Heal and McLeod (1983) and the interested reader is referred to that paper for a detailed analysis.
. CONCLUSIONS -1 8-
We have considered a situation where an inflow of capital investment into a country's oil sector has allowed that country to run a deficit on its balance of trade The capital inflow is, of course . matched by an accumulation of indebt edness to foreigners . An inflow of foreign capital . whether used for consumption or for investment, inevitably affects the internal equilibrium of the receiving country . Consumption patterns, production patterns, and prices all change. The same is true of the lending country it changes its consumption pattern by making a loan. and for this reason, and because the equilibrium of its trading partner changes, its own domestic equilibrium alters . A crucial factor in determuxing these macro effects of a loan is the change in relative prices (oil prices, industrial prices, and prices of basic goods that are not traded) . A loan must be of a significant size before having a measurable impact on prices, and the cases we discussed here, where the loan is of the order of 100 billion US dollars, certainly fit this description.
It is clear, then . that it is a complex matter to trace the full impacts of a loan from one trading country to another. Our model has enabled us to identify these impacts in a rather simple fashion, because of our somewhat stylized assumptions, and to assess the gains and the losses arising from such a loan for different groups within the lending and borrowing countries . One important feature to emerge is that the loan may have a beneficial effect on the equilibrium of the lending country. This happens when the borrowed funds are used to increase oil supplies, leading to more abundant oil. increased oil exports, and lower oil prices . The terms of trade of the lending country improve, and this leadsto higher levels of consumption of both goods in the lending country . Theorem 1 establishes the conditions under which the welfare level in the lending country will rise as a result. In making a social cost-benefit analysis of such a loan, this is a point that should clearly be considered: there is a social return to the loan over and above the rate of interest paid on it. It is possible that even if a major rescheduling that delayed repayment were to happen, the lending country as a whole could nevertheless benefit . Private financial institutions making the loan might of course be strained in such a situation. There could then be an argument in favor of the government compensating banks in the case of temporary losses. in view of the positive externalities that their actions have generated for the rest of the economy . Obviously, such a policy would require very careful analysis of the macro effects and of the international markets concerned.
_19-
Similar issues apply to the receiving country . The borrowing sector may benefit in commercial terms from the loan, but a social cost-benefit analysis of the loan should also take into account its effects on the overall economic equilibrium . As Theorem 1 shows, these could be substantially negative . if there has been overspecialization in one sector thus leading to lower terms of trade for the country, with correspondingly negative welfare effects . In summary, the fact that a loan, if large, may affect the equilibrium pattern of prices and quantities in both countries means that it will have macroeconomic consequences going tar beyond its impacts on the profits of the borrowing and leading institutions .
Theorems 1 and 2 have indicated two very different possible outcomes. In one case, the effects are beneficial to the lending and harmful to the borrowing country, while in the other case the opposite is true. The disUnguishuig feature is the effect of the loan on the oil exporter's terms of trade. In the first case, they worsen, and in the second, they improve . Which of these two outcomes occurs depends on the patterns of factor intensities in the receiving country and the initial price levels . Once these are known, thus establishing whether the loan improves or worsens the receiver's terms of trade, everything else can be traced . Experience indicates that over the last three years, the terms of trade of oil exporters have worsened. While many factors have contributed to this price movement, this suggests that a policy of borrowing to invest in the oil sector might not have been the most favorable to the oil exporter . However, such a policy could be favorable to the lender ; it yields more oil at lower prices. Such macro outcomes should be computed when discussing the present situation. The calculus of the debt must go beyond the financial aspects, and must include the macroeconomic effects on prices, imports, and exports of both countries .
It is important to emphasize that we have studied the consequences of granting a loan before thus was repaid The repayments will not have effects that are simply equal and opposite to those of the granting of the loan. The asymmetry arises because . when the loan is made, it is invested or consumed in sectors different than those that will pay the debt . For instance, in this paper the debt was used to build up the production capacity of the oil sector However, when the loan is repaid, this will not of course coincide with running down this capacity . Investment is irreversible, and capital stock and machines depreciate . The loan will be repaid by running a balance-of-trade surplus. The effects of running a trade surplus at a constant capacity level in the oil sector are not the opposite of those running a trade deficit and using the capital inflow to expand oil-producing capacity . As a matter of fact, both could affect the major macro variables in the same direction. This distinction between receiving and repaying a loan will be developed further in a subsequent paper .
Finally . we point out a connection between the problem that we have studied here and the extensive literature on the transfer problem in international economics. This literature is concerned with the possibility that a transfer of resources from one agent, or country to another may benefit the donor and harm the recipient. This issue has so far been studied only in the context of a barter economy without production in the case of perfectly competitive general equilibrium models For surveys of these results, see Chuchilnisky (1980) . Jones (1983) . and Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) . Our present Theorem I provides an example of the transfer paradox in a production economy resources are transferred from lender to borrower, and the lender gains as a result (Theorem 1). even though the receiver expands its production capacity . This appendix gives an explicit analytic solution to the model . and presents the results of numerical simulations on the effects of rescheduling the debt reported in the paper.
In order to solve the model we consider first exported with oll imported:
XS -Me
In view of (6) . (9) . and (6)'. this equals Substituting w / pB and r from (A.7) into (A5), we obtain a new Implicit function. in four rather than five variables :
Recall that pa may be different from pB because B is not traded internationally . The last step is to substitute pB and pB as functions of pl into (A.B) . This will lead to an implicit function in two variables
Since FT is an exogenously given parameter, (A.9) is an analytic solution to the model . from (A.9) we may compute the equilibrium level of industrial prices pj(FT) .
1t is easy to check that once pJ is known, we may solve for the equilibrium values of all other endogenous variables . This will be explained below Now, in order to obtain pB =PB(p/), we use another market-clearing condition . this time in the B-market: Usmg again the factor-commodity price relations, (A.12) yields an implicit relation between pB and p/, as desired : 
